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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM:
WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T
W. Kip VISCUSIt
Commentary prepared for Denver Law Review Symposium, Driven
by Data: Empirical Legal Studies in Civil Litigation and Health Law
ABSTRACT

Concerns with medical malpractice liability costs have been a
principal factor leading states to adopt a series of tort liability reforms.
Following the enactment of medical malpractice reforms, medical
malpractice premiums have been declining, creating less of a cost-based
impetus for additional reforms. The most consistent empirical evidence
that indicates statistically significant effects of medical malpractice
reforms has come from caps on noneconomic damages. Damages caps
reduce insurance losses and foster insurer profitability, consistent with the
objective of caps. The impacts of caps are greatest for insurance
companies that otherwise would have experienced the greatest losses in
the state. However, caps may reduce payouts to plaintiffs, potentially
reducing the funds available to cover economic losses and attorney fees.
More recent medical malpractice reforms, apology laws, may have a
counterproductive effect by encouraging apologies that have the
unintended consequence of increasing litigation and damages payments.
There is also evidence that medical malpractice reforms affect both the
delivery of medical care and the supply of physicians, but these effects are
not as prominent as the impacts on payouts. Medical malpractice liability
remains an inefficient way to transfer funds to injured patients. The share
of litigation and defense expenses relative to costs remains high. The early
offer reform proposal is one approach that is directed at reducing these
costs.
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I.

OVERVIEW: WHAT ISSUES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED?

Policy initiatives to enhance the performance of the health care
system and the viability of medical malpractice insurance markets have
included a variety of medical malpractice reforms.' These efforts
potentially affect the circumstances under which injured patients are
eligible for compensation and the levels of compensation that they receive.
For example, reforms of statutes of limitation will affect whether there is
liability for injuries to a patient. 2 Reforms that place caps on noneconomic
damages will affect the amount that the plaintiff can receive as
compensation for noneconomic losses.3 Other types of medical
malpractice liability reforms include, among others, attorney fee limits;
joint and several liability reform; collateral-source rule reform; statutes of
limitations and repose; and apology laws. 4 Medical malpractice reforms,
consequently, may have diverse ramifications for injured patients, patient
5
treatments, physicians, health care institutions, attorneys, and insurers.
This Article provides an overview of the empirical evidence regarding
some of these impacts, and an assessment of which laws have been most
influential.
An overriding issue that should frame the discussion is how we define
what we mean by successful reforms. A common empirical approach is to
explore which reform efforts have had statistically significant effects on
various policy-relevant variables of interest, such as the effect of reforms
on losses incurred by medical malpractice insurers.6 While it is possible to
categorize reforms that have no statistically significant influence on any
measures of interest as being ineffective, having statistically significant
impacts does not necessarily qualify as a success. For example, abolishing
all potential liability for medical malpractice would certainly generate a
statistically significant impact in reducing medical malpractice costs, but
it would also harm injured patients who would not be compensated for the
harms. Because medical malpractice reforms have such diverse effects on
the health care system, patients, insurers, and attorneys, the discussion
1.
See MICHELLE M. MELLO & ALLEN KACHALIA, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: EVIDENCE ON
REFORM ALTERNATIVES AND CLAIMS INVOLVING ELDERLY PATIENTS 1 (2016).

2.
Id. at 58.
3. Id. at 32.
4. Id. at45-61, 89 93.
5. Id. at 1-2.
6.
See, e.g., Patricia Born, W. Kip Viscusi & Tom Baker, The Effects o] Tort Reform on
Medical MalpracticeInsurers' Ultimate Losses, 76 J. RISK & INS. 197, 198 (2009).

2019]

MEDICAL MALPRA CTICE REFORM

below will focus primarily on identifying the different kinds of effects as
well as some of the competing concerns that may arise with respect to
them. However, the discussion does not equate statistically significant
impacts with increases in social welfare.
The presence of a perceived "crisis" is often the impetus for policy
action, whether it is for a declared immigration crisis at the border or a
liability crisis that threatens to harm the insurance industry.7 Examining
whether medical malpractice reform is timely with respect to a liability
crisis is a legitimate matter of interest, but should not be a requirement for
assessing whether potential reforms will be beneficial. The broader
concern is whether, on balance, the reforms will enhance social welfare,
taking into account all of the economy-wide impacts. There could be
undesirable reforms launched during a period of perceived crisis, and also
reforms that could serve a constructive function even in the absence of a
crisis if, for example, a reform was successful in reducing litigation costs
without any attendant, adverse effects on patients.
This Article's review of many of the effects of medical malpractice
reforms will seek to distinguish which reforms have had the greatest
demonstrable impacts. What have been the effects of the reforms on
patient welfare, health care, and insurance-market performance? Because
not all reforms have been adopted in every state, examining the impact of
the different reforms serves to highlight laws that have had a particularly
noteworthy performance that other states may wish to emulate or avoid.
The more general empirical issues are whether the current medical
malpractice liability system operates in a manner that best promotes
societal welfare, and, if that is not the case, which alternative policies
might be preferable.
Despite a substantial body of empirical research on medical
malpractice, including work that is still ongoing, there are still many
empirical issues that have yet to be resolved. 8 In recognition of this gap,
one focus of this Article is to identify some of the most prominent
outstanding issues in the empirical assessments of medical malpractice.
The discussion below first reviews the impetus for medical
malpractice reform and then turns to the impacts of these reforms on
insurance-market performance, the effect of the recently adopted apology
law reforms, the effect on the health-care system, and a potential
alternative liability reform. In almost all of these instances there will be
competing impacts that ultimately must be taken into account in making a
7.
See Joe Ward & Anjali Singhvi, Trump Claims There Is a Crisis at the Border. What's the
2019),
11,
(Jan.
TIMES
N.Y.
Reality?
see
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/1 1/uspolitics/trump-border-crisis-reality.html;
also W. KiP ViscuSi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1-41 (1991) (discussing the existence,
dimensions, and consequences of the liability crisis).

8.

Other reviews similarly note that there is often insufficient evidence to make definitive

empirical assessments. See Michelle M. Mello, Allen Kachalia & David M. Studdert, Medical
Liability-Prospectsfor FederalReform, 376 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1806, 1806-07 (2017).
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broader assessment of the overall desirability of the reform. Part II
examines the factors that are related to the impetus for medical malpractice
reforms, such as cost pressures, insurer profitability, and premium levels.
Part III explores the set of long-established tort reform approaches and
their effects on insurance markets, where the most influential reform has
been placing limits on noneconomic damages. A more recent reform
approach is the adoption of apology laws, which is the subject of Part IV.
Medical malpractice reforms not only affect insurance markets but also
may have ramifications for patient safety and treatments, which are
considered in Part V, and physician mobility and litigation costs, which
are the focus of Part VI. A possible strategy for limiting these litigation
costs is an early offer proposal that is designed to expedite out-of-court
settlements. That approach is examined in Part VII. Part VIII summarizes
the current status of the performance of medical malpractice reforms.
II. THE IMPETUS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM
Much of the support for tort liability reform has stemmed from a
desire to influence liability costs.9 Lowering liability costs will enhance
insurer profitability in the short run, will lead to a reduction in insurance
premiums, and will reduce the liability costs for physicians and health care
institutions. 0 The counterpart of cost reductions is often lower levels of
payouts to claimants, particularly if the reforms take the approach of
limiting damages amounts. In addition to influencing the level of costs,
liability reforms can also reduce the variability of liability costs. " Making
losses more predictable can potentially enhance insurance-market
performance by giving firms a greater ability to estimate the losses for
which they will have to make payouts for the premiums they have written.
Other legitimate objectives of liability reforms could be to deter medical
errors and to promote the efficient mobility of physicians.' 2 As the review
below will indicate, fulfilling all of these objectives simultaneously is not
feasible, as some, such as limiting costs and providing compensation to
claimants, are often in conflict.
The impetus for the major wave of medical malpractice reforms in
the mid- 1980s was the perceived liability crisis in the insurance industry. 3
9.
See Born, Viseusi & Baker, supra note 6, at 197.
10.
For any given level of premiums, higher insurance costs will lower the level of profitability
because insurance profitability is inversely related to the ratio of losses to premiums (i.e., the loss
ratio). See W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia Born, Damages Caps, Insurability,and the Performance of
Medical Malpractice Insurance, 72 J. RISK & INS. 23, 27 (2005) [hereinafter Viseusi & Born,
Damages Caps]. For a discussion of the effect of medical practice reforms on insurance costs and,
consequently, on consumers, see W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia Born, The National Implications of
LiabilityReforms for GeneralLiability and Medical MalpracticeInsurance, 24 SETON HALL L. REv.
1743, 1765 (1994) [hereinafter Viscusi & Born, Liability Reforms].
11.
See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1525-26 (1987) (emphasizing the importance of returning stability to insurance markets).
12.
See Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 8 (noting these and other performance
dimensions).
13.
See VISCUSI, supra note 7; Viscusi & Born, Liability Reforms, supra note 10, at 1743.
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A useful barometer of the health of the insurance industry is an index of
its profitability, known as the loss ratio (i.e., the ratio of insurance losses
divided by the corresponding value of the premiums).14 Higher loss ratios
are an indicator of lower levels of profitability, with the other principal
profitability considerations being administrative costs and the return that
the firm can earn on investing the premiums, which are paid before the
losses are incurred.15 Consider the results based on insurance-market data
by firm, by state, and by year from 1984 to 1991-a pivotal period for the
adoption of liability reforms. 16 High loss ratios led states to adopt medical
malpractice reforms based on an empirical analysis of the relationship
between the profitability of medical malpractice insurance in the state and
the adoption of medical malpractice reforms.' 7
Lower levels of insurance profitability will also lead insurance firms
to raise premiums to cover these losses and to maintain profitability. 18
From the standpoint of physicians, the level of the premiums that must be
paid is a reflection of their liability costs, but the level and rate of change
in premiums also serve as useful measures for whether there is a perceived
liability crisis.19 To the extent that change is what is consequential, a
rapidly rising level of medical malpractice premiums might be evidence
that there was a liability crisis. Figure 1 presents the national statistics for
the net premiums written for medical malpractice coverage for the decade
from 2007 to 2016.2' Even without any adjustment for inflation, which
would make the more recent costs appear to be even lower, there has been
a dramatic drop in premiums, from $10.0 billion in 2007 to $8.1 billion in
2016.21 Thus, the medical-malpractice-premium trend has been down, not
up. While it is possible to suggest that some reforms might enhance
insurance-market performance and the liability system more generally,
based on the trend in total medical malpractice premiums, there is no
evident crisis being manifested in the premium trends.

14.
See Charles L. McClenahan, Ratemaking, in FOUNDATIONS OF CASUALTY ACTUARIAL
SCIENCE 25, 25 (1990).
15.
William B. Fairley, Investment Income and ProfitMargins in Property-LiabilityInsurance:
Theory and EmpiricalResults, 10 BELL J. ECON. 192, 201-02 (1979).
See Viscusi & Born, Liability Reforms, supra note 10, at 1747.
16.
Id. at 1764-65.
17.

18.
The goal of insurance ratemaking is to set rates to provide adequate funds to cover losses,
or to maintain a profitable ratio of losses to premiums (i.e., the loss ratio). See McClenahan, supra
note 14, at 33.
19.
See VISCUSI, supra note 7, at 25-31 (discussing premium changes as a measure of changes

in liability costs regarding the 1980s tort liability crisis).
20.
21.

See INS. INFO. INST., 2018 INSURANCE FACT BOOK 129 (2018).
Id.
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Figure 1: Medical Malpractice Net Premiums Written
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III. EFFECTS OF LIABILITY REFORMS ON INSURANCE MARKETS
Finding that there has been an effect of medical-malpractice-reform
packages on insurance-market performance does not, however, isolate the
particular reforms that have been most influential. To do this, studies have
addressed not only the influence of reforms in general but also the impact
of specific reforms such as limits on noneconomic damages, limits on
attorney fees, limits on the insurability of punitive damages, the
prohibition of punitive damages for medical malpractice, and other
reforms.2 2 One study of medical malpractice data found that liability
reforms generally reduced loss ratios, but the specific types of reforms did
not have a statistically significant effect, except for damages caps and
limits on attorney fees.2 3 The most consistent, statistically significant
effects on medical malpractice insurance losses were for tort reforms
generally but, in terms of reform components, it was the damages cap
variable that was most consistently significant.2 4 However, there was also
a statistically significant effect in reducing insurance losses from
25
collateral-source rule reforms and limits on attorney fees.
A subsequent medical malpractice insurance study similarly found
statistically significant effects of various reform variables on different
aspects of medical malpractice insurance. Punitive damages reform,
prohibition of punitive damages, and noneconomic damages reform all
reduced medical malpractice insurance losses.2 6 As one might expect, the
impacts on reducing losses were also similar to the effects on insurer
profitability, as noneconomic damages reforms and prohibition of punitive
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 476-78.
Id. at 480-82.
Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 486, 488.
See Viscusi & Born, Damages Caps, supra note 10, at 32-33.
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damages all led to a reduction in medical malpractice insurance loss
ratios. Noneconomic damages reforms and laws that do not allow
punitive damages in medical malpractice cases are both negatively
associated with premium levels.28
Because medical malpractice claims often take a long time to be
resolved, it is instructive to examine the long-run impacts on insurance
markets rather than the more immediate effects captured in the studies
discussed above. An analysis of medical malpractice insurance data from
1984 to 2003 considered these impacts on what are termed "developed
losses," which provide for long-term impact of tort reforms on the
trajectory of losses over time. 29 Rather than considering the short-term
effects of the initially reported losses, the analysis considered the longterm negative effect of tort reforms on insurer losses." ° The largest,
consistently significant effect in constraining developed losses is the
imposition of a noneconomic damages cap.3'
The overall impact of the reforms depends not only on the average
effect across the entire insurance market but also on the distribution of the
effect of the losses.32 Do the reforms have the same proportional effect on
losses for all firms, or are there differences in the impacts across the
industry? Exploration of these differences is made possible using quantile
regressions, which estimate the impact of the reforms across the
distribution of firms' losses, such as firms at the 10th percentile, the 25th
percentile, the median, the 75th percentile, and the 90th percentile of the
loss distribution. 33 The largest impact on reducing losses is at the high loss
end of the distribution for the impacts of noneconomic damages reforms,
punitive damages reforms, prohibition of punitive damages, and other
reforms. 34 The firms that otherwise would have experienced large losses
relative to premiums are those that reap the greatest benefits from the
reforms. 35 In contrast, the effects are modest-and in some cases not
statistically significant-for the more profitable firms that have low levels
36
of losses relative to premiums.

27. Id. at 38-39.
28.
Id. at 37-38.
29. See Born, Viscusi & Baker, supra note 6, at 200.
30. Id. at 198.
31.
Id. at 197,212.
32. See id. at 208-12 (discussing the different effects of tort reforms across the distribution of
firms with different levels of losses); Viscusi & Born, Damages Caps, supra note 10, at 34.
33.
See Born, Viscusi & Baker, supra note 6, at 210-11; Viscusi & Born, Damages Caps, supra
note 10, at 35.
34. See Born, Viscusi & Baker, supra note 6, at 210-11; Viscusi & Born, Damages Caps, supra
note 10, at 34-36.
35. See Born, Viscusi & Baker, supra note 6, at 210-11; Viscusi & Born, Damages Caps, supra
note 10, at 34-36.
36. See Born, Viscusi & Baker, supra note 6, at 210-11; Viscusi & Born, Damages Caps, supra
note 10, at 34-36.
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The health-policy literature on these reforms has yielded similar
evidence regarding which of these reforms are influential, often including
results from the medical and health care literature.3 7 Caps on noneconomic
damages reduce compensation amounts, and there is more moderate
evidence that caps reduce both the frequency of paid claims and the growth
of liability insurance premiums.3 8 Attorney fee limits do no alter
compensation amounts, and there is also moderate evidence that they do
not alter either the frequency of claims or liability insurance premiums. 3 9
Collateral-source rule reforms and joint and several liability reforms,
likewise, do not appear to affect compensation amounts.4a

IV. THE ADVENT OF APOLOGY LAWS
Although most of the more traditional medical malpractice reforms
have focused on various damages-related laws, a majority of the states
have adopted evidence-related reforms known as apology laws. 4' After
committing a medical error, or simply providing care that has an
unfortunate outcome, the physician may apologize to the patient or the
patient's family. Apology laws make apologies inadmissible in medical
malpractice lawsuits, and in some cases the apology laws also exclude
statements of fault and liability. 42 Although apology laws are different in
structure from reforms that place caps on noneconomic damages and
punitive damages, they have been designated as a form of "de facto tort
reform.- 43 Thirty-four of the thirty-nine states that have adopted apology
laws are of the partial apology law form that only protect the apology, not
admissions of fault and liability.' The full apology laws protect statements
of apology, condolence, and sympathy and also protect statements of fault,
error, or liability.4 5 Massachusetts adopted the first apology law in 1986,
and was followed by Texas in 1999, but the main wave in adopting these
laws was not until the 2004 to 2007 period when twenty-four states
adopted apology laws.46

37.

See MELLO & KACHALIA, supra note 1, at 101-03; Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note

8, at 1807-08.
38.

See Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 8, at 1807-08.

39.

Id. at 1807.

40.
Id.
41.
See Benjamin J. McMichael, R. Lawrence Van Horn & W. Kip Viscusi, "Sorry" Is Never
Enough: How State Apology Laws Fail to Reduce Medical MalpracticeLiability Risk, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 341,395-99 (2019).
42.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.4026(2) (2018) ("The portion of statements, writings, or

benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain,
suffering, or death of a person involved in an accident and made to that person or to the family of that

person shall be inadmissible as evidence in a civil action.").
43.
Yonathan A. Arbel & Yotam Kaplan, Tort Reform Through the Back Door: A Critique of
Law and Apologies, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1201 (2017).
44.
McMichael, Van Horn & Viscusi, supra note 41, at 356.
45.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-416 (2018).
46.
See McMichael, Van Horn & Viscusi, supra note 41.
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The impetus for adopting these laws was twofold. States adopted
these laws in an effort to reduce medical malpractice costs by excluding
evidence that might increase physicians' liability.4 7 In addition, there was
a belief that apology laws could serve a constructive function by fostering
apologies from physicians.48 These apologies could enable physicians to
express sympathy for the adverse outcome and also might assuage anger
on the part of the injured party. 49
How promoting apologies might ultimately affect liability is not clear
in the absence of empirical evidence, which until recently had been quite
limited.5" Apologies might make injured patients less likely to file a claim
because they feel better about the outcome after receiving the apology."
An alternative possibility is that apologies might enhance the chance that
the patient will file a claim if the apology makes it clear that the physician
made a mistake.52 While the patient cannot introduce the apology in
evidence, knowing that the injury was the result of a medical error may
increase patient's assessed chance of making a successful claim for the
53
injury.
To assess the empirical impact of apology laws, a recent study
analyzed medical malpractice claims for a comprehensive longitudinal
sample consisting of 90% of all physicians of a single specialty in the
country54 The time period considered for the analysis was 2004 to 2014,
and the analysis accounted for a wide range of physician and regional
characteristics.5 5 The analysis distinguished differences between
nonsurgeons and surgeons." The authors' reasoning was that, for surgical
procedures, patients are more likely to anticipate that they are incurring
potential risk, while for nonsurgical treatments, there is less of that
expectation.57 As a consequence of this differential information, an
apology that admits to a medical error that caused the patient harm is likely
to be more of a surprise to patients in nonsurgical contexts.
The empirical findings indicated no statistically significant effects of
apology laws on liability outcomes for surgeons, but there were costincreasing effects for nonsurgeons.58 In particular, apology laws increased
47.

See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1 60 cmt.; TENN. R. EvID. 409.1 cmt.

48. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
333, 368 (2006); McMichael, Van Horn & Viscusi, supra note 41, at 349-50.
49. See AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 181 (2005); MeMichael, Van Horn & Viscusi, supra
note 41, at 350.
50. See Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 8, at 1807 (concluding that there was
"insufficient evidence" to assess the impact of apology laws).
51.
McMichael, Van Horn & Viscusi, supra note 41, at 361.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54. Id. at 363.
55.
Id. at 363, 373, 399.
56. Id. at 342, 348, 402.
57.
See id. at 360-61.
58.
Id. at 348, 402.
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the probability of lawsuits, increased the payments by insurers to resolve
the claims, and increased defense costs for nonsurgeons. 59 On balance, for
nonsurgeons, the more influential impact of apology laws was to increase
the likelihood that patients would pursue claims for medical injuries after
receiving an apology. 60
This broad empirical assessment contrasts with the results in some
case studies, such as the performance of apology laws in hospitals that
have adopted the apology approach. 6' However, these efforts have been
successful in avoiding an increase in liability perhaps because they may
have been accompanied by other measures such as physician-training
programs because the success stories are often at academic medical
centers. 62 As a result, it is possible that such findings in very narrowly
defined locales, rather than a national sample, also reflect the influence of
factors other than the presence of an apology law protection. If training
programs are, in fact, effective in providing guidance for making
successful apologies, then hospitals may be able to implement such
measures by adopting the training programs incorporated in the
Communication and Optimal Resolution (CANDOR) Toolkit developed
63
by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
V. REFORM

IMPACTS ON PATIENT SAFETY, MEDICAL ERRORS, AND

TREATMENT QUALITY

Medical malpractice reforms affect physicians' liability, which in
turn may affect their treatment practices, such as which procedures to
undertake and which diagnostic tests to administer. 6' While there is no
comprehensive assessment of all of the potential effects of medical
malpractice liability reforms on patient safety, medical errors, and
treatment quality, there have been several analyses that have addressed
different components of this issue. A review of several key tort liability
reforms found that there was no change in the quality of care as the result
of joint and several liability reforms or collateral-source rule reforms, but
that caps on noneconomic damages reduced some types of defensive
65
medicine.

59.
60.

Id. at 348, 393.
Id. at 393.

61.
See, e.g., Allen Kachalia et al., Liability Claims and Costs Before and Afler Implementation
ofa Medical ErrorDisclosure Program, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 213, 215 (2010) (finding that

a program which encouraged physicians to apologize decreased the risk of medical malpractice
liability); see also Megan A. Adams et al., Effect of a Health System's Medical Error Disclosure
Program on Gastroenterology-RelatedClaims Rates and Costs, 109 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY
460, 461-62 (2014); Richard C. Boothman et al., A Better Approach to Medical MalpracticeClaims?
The University of Michigan Experience, 2 J. HEALTH & LiFE SCI. L. 125, 143-44 (2009).
62.
See McMichael, Van Horn & Viscusi, supra note 41, at 348.

63.

Id. at 391-92.

64.

See Mello, Kachalia & Studdert, supra note 8, at 1807.

65.

Id. at 1807-08.
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Further review of pertinent studies also suggests that there is a
reasonable relationship between medical malpractice costs and patient
safety, and that medical malpractice reforms do not appear to have
undermined this linkage.66 At the broadest level, there is a plausible
relationship between which hospitals have the highest medical malpractice
costs and the quality of medical care being provided, which is a result that
is inconsistent with the claims of some advocates of medical malpractice
reform.67 In particular, higher medical malpractice costs in Florida and
Texas are positively associated with adverse patient safety events, as
measured by the Patient Safety Indicators, developed by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality.68 While this analysis does not identify
any causal relationships, it does indicate that the financial costs imposed
by medical malpractice liability are not random but are targeted at the
69
practices that put patients at risk.
Changes in liability costs can potentially induce changes in medical
treatments. In an empirical analysis of four specific obstetric and
gynecologic procedures, the author found that the effect of the reforms on
medical treatments varied, but that increased liability through joint and
several liability reform decreased preventable complications, which would
be consistent with a deterrent effect of liability.7 However, that study also
found that punitive damages caps and collateral source rules appeared to
increase preventable medical conditions. 7y Less clear-cut results emerged
from a different study of acute heart disease, as there was no evidence that
tort reforms altered the quality of care.7 2 A third study of treatment quality
found that that there was no evidence of adverse effects of the decreased
73
liability associated with medical malpractice reforms.
A prominent hypothesis is that medical malpractice costs increase
defensive medicine as physicians undertake procedures or tests to reduce
their liability exposure. 74 A principal case study on this topic has been with
respect to whether medical malpractice liability affects the frequency of
Caesarean sections (C-sections), which doctors may undertake to reduce
potential liability associated with childbirths. One study found that
increased medical malpractice costs increased C-sections but did not
66.

See id. at 1807-08; Bernard S. Black, May R. Wagner & Zenon Zabinski, The Association
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See id. at 135.
70.
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ECON. 161, 164, 180 (2013).
71.
Id. at 180.
72.
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ECON. 353, 388 (1996).
73.
See Michael Frakes & Anupam B. Jena, Does Medical MalpracticeLaw Improve Health
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increase infant health. 7" However, other researchers found that
noneconomic damages caps increased complications from labor and use
of C-sections, while joint and several liability reforms, which limit joint
and several defendant liability to situations in which the defendant was
liable for at least 50% of the tort, decreased complications from labor and
use of C-sections.7 6 There is also empirical evidence on the extent of the
causal linkage with respect to how doctors respond to medical malpractice
costs. Medical errors resulting in malpractice litigation led to a 4% jump
in C-sections and an 8% increase in C-sections after 2.5 years.7 7
There is also the expected linkage between the provision of highquality care and the reduction in medical malpractice costs. An analysis of
patterns across states found that more money spent on health insurance
decreased medical malpractice losses.7 8 Similarly, more health care
decreased medical malpractice costs.79 The extent of the linkage, however,
is modest, as each $1 in health insurance claims reduced medical
malpractice claims by $0.01 to $0.05 per capita. 8" Because much health
care is directed at matters other than altering medical malpractice costs,
one would not expect there to be a substantial relationship. The reverse
direction of influence between health insurance and medical malpractice
insurance is not influential, as decreases in medical malpractice risks have
little effect on health insurance losses.8 ' To the extent that health insurance
levels serve as a proxy for the level of care, this result also would be
consistent with medical malpractice reforms not leading to an overall
cutback in care.
VI. MOBILITY AND LITIGATION COST EFFECTS

A. Mobility Effects
Do locales with high medical malpractice costs deter physicians from
practicing in these areas, and are there differences among medical
specialties in these effects? The presence of noneconomic damages caps
in states serves to attract physicians to the state. 2 An exit survey of
75.
See Lisa Dubay, Robert Kaestner & Timothy Waidmann, The Impact of MalpracticeFears
on CaesareanSection Rates, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 491,497, 515 (1999).
76.
See Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth
Outcomes, 123 Q.J. ECON. 795, 797, 800 (2008).
77.
See Ity Shurtz, The Impact of Medical Errors on Physician Behavior: Evidence from
Malpractice Litigation, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 331, 331-32 (2013).
78.
See J. Bradley Karl, Patricia H. Born & W. Kip Viscusi, The Relationship Between the
Markets for Health Insurance and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 48 APPLIED ECON. 5348, 5359
(2016).
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80.
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medical residents in New York State found that there was an increased
supply of physicians to states with noneconomic damages caps for medical
malpractice, but there was no comparable effect with punitive damages
caps. 3 The impacts on physician supply are not uniform, as it is the supply
of physicians in the specialties that face the greatest84 liability risks that are
most influenced by the presence of a damages cap.
An intriguing result pertains to the mobility of physicians in a baseperiod state once a neighboring state has adopted a noneconomic damages
cap." The more favorable liability environment in the neighboring state
leads to the expected exit of physicians, as the ratio of the number of
physicians to the population in the base-period state declines after a
neighboring state adopts a reform.8 6 The physicians that exit either were
practicing in high-liability risk areas or were more prone to liability costs
as state medical malpractice rates declined after their exit.87
Overall, there is strong evidence that noneconomic damages caps
lead to a modest increase in physician supply. 88 However, based on the
strong empirical evidence that is available, there is no reason to conclude
that either joint and several liability reforms or collateral-source rule
reforms alter physician supply.89 Similarly, a moderate degree of empirical
evidence fails to indicate any effect of attorney fee limits in altering
physician supply. 9
B. Litigation Costs
From the standpoint of operating an efficient system of delivering
damages payments to injured parties, it would be desirable to do so without
incurring substantial litigation costs. Analysis of closed commercial
claims data for insurance lines, including medical malpractice, can be used
to assess the legal costs incurred by claimants and defendants. For claims
filed in Texas from 1988 to 2004, legal fees and court costs overall were
$0.75 per $1 paid to claimants and $0.83 per $1 paid if the claimant
retained an attorney and filed a lawsuit. 9' The costs for the medical
malpractice component of these claims may be even greater, as the legal
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fees and expenses for both92sides have been estimated to average about $1
for every $1 in payments.
While there has been evidence that legal fees have been increasing
over time, these costs appear to be stabilizing. From 1988 to 2004, defense
costs and reserves for legal fees and expenses for medical malpractice
cases in Texas rose at an annual rate of 4.6% per year on an inflationadjusted basis. 93 The national statistics on medical malpractice defense
costs and containment expenses indicate substantial expenses that, in
absolute terms, have recently been fairly stable, with values of $1.8735
billion in 2014, $1.8679 billion in 2015, and $1.9205 billion in 2016, all
of which round off to $1.9 billion. 94 Because of year-to-year fluctuations
in insured losses, the defense costs as a percent of insured losses is more95
variable, at a level of 44.3% in 2014, 53.7% in 2015, and 50.3% in 2016.
By definition, the costs incurred by claimants are in addition to these
amounts, reflecting the substantial costs in resolving medical malpractice
claims. Other than products liability insurance, medical malpractice
insurance has the highest share of defense costs96as a percent of insured
losses of all commercial liability insurance lines.
VII. THE EARLY OFFER PLAN

From the standpoint of running an efficient compensation system,
one might view it as being desirable to reduce the share of attorney fees97
and legal expenses relative to the level of payments to injured parties.
However, for the attorneys who might be affected by cost-reducing
reforms, these legal costs are their income opportunities, leading to
opposition to early offer plans by medical malpractice plaintiffs'
lawyers. 98 Policy proposals that seek to reduce these costs, and
consequently their income, may not necessarily be embraced by either the
plaintiff or defense bar.
The one proposal I focus on here is the early offer plan, which is the
medical malpractice descendant of various no-fault insurance proposals
espoused by Jeffrey O'Connell, and which Joni Hersch and I first proposed
Bernard Black, et al., Defense Costs and Insurer Reserves in Medical Malpractice and
92.
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for medical malpractice in conjunction with him. 99 Under this scheme,
within 180 days after a claim is filed, defendants can make an offer to
l °°
claimants for their net economic damages and their attorney fees.
Defendants are not required to make an offer, as well might be the situation
if they dispute the claim, in which case the usual medical malpractice
liability structure would prevail. If the defendant makes an offer, the
plaintiff can accept the offer, which addresses both economic loss and
legal expenses. 01 If the plaintiff turns the offer down, the plaintiff can still
pursue conventional tort claim, but the legal standards for both the burden
of proof and the level of misconduct will be raised to a showing of gross
negligence on the part of the defendant. 0' 2 The rationale for this proposal
is to provide prompt payment for the claimant's economic losses and
attorney fees.' 0 3
Missing from the proposal is payment for pain and suffering
damages. In general, people do not purchase insurance for pain and
suffering losses, and, from the standpoint of economic analysis, the
optimal insurance policy typically would not provide for such coverage.' 04
That economic result does not imply that pain and suffering damages serve
no useful purpose. Under the present tort liability regime, pain and
suffering compensation does provide financial resources for claimants to
be able to pay their attorneys and still be able to have remaining funds to
address their economic losses, depending on the attorney fee share.' 0 5
However, under the early offer proposal, the payment of attorney fees is
included so that there is no need to have additional pain and suffering
compensation to provide the financial leeway to address the economic loss
component.
An empirical analysis using Texas malpractice data showed that the
early offer approach could lead to a substantial reduction in litigation
costs, and medical malpractice costs more generally, by about $100,000 to
' Claimants would receive more prompt payment of
$200,000 per claim. 06
economic losses and attorney fees but would lose the pain and suffering
compensation to the extent that such compensation would have exceeded
their attorney fee share.'0 7 The absence of such payments for pain and
suffering potentially could reduce the total payment to injured patients,
depending on the share of attorney fees that they must pay, which some
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view as a drawback of the early offer scheme. °8 While the reduction in
litigation costs would reduce the payments to both plaintiff and defense
attorneys, it would decrease the uncertainty that plaintiff attorneys might
otherwise face if paid on a contingency fee basis.' 09 Most important is that
it would reduce the inefficiency of the current system and would provide
0
for prompt and certain payments to injured patients. "
To date, the only state that has enacted an early offer reform proposal
is New Hampshire. ' The early offer bill was originally vetoed before it
was ultimately enacted and had been opposed by both medical malpractice
plaintiffs' lawyers and by the two largest medical malpractice insurers in
the state." 2 The early offer plan consequently did not have the political
support from insurers that one might expect for a plan targeted at reducing
medical malpractice costs. The lack of broad support may have contributed
to the failure of other states to adopt the early offer approach.
VIII. DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM
The most consistent empirical result to date is that noneconomic
damages caps have been most influential to medical malpractice reform in
controlling liability costs. Restraining these costs may be desirable to the
extent that one views noneconomic damages as being more speculative
given that juries have no precise guidance for how to map their concerns
with pain and suffering into a dollar amount. However, if the cap is a very
low absolute amount or the damages amounts are substantial, there is the
danger that, in the presence of the cap, the remaining funds, after paying
for attorney fees, may not be sufficient to address the plaintiff's economic
losses.
More innovative approaches than a rigid damages cap system merit
exploration. Recent efforts to enact apology laws that provide protections
for statements of apology by physicians represent one such example.
However, empirically these efforts have not served to reduce the
likelihood of being found liable or the level of damages, as the impacts
may be counterproductive on balance.
The early offer proposal is an alternative that has not been enacted
broadly. Based on simulations using Texas malpractice insurance data,
adoption of this approach will lead to substantial cost reductions. This
proposal is an example of one approach that would both restrain
108.
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noneconomic damages and also ensure that the attorney fees were covered
without cutting into the funds available for economic damages. While only
one state has adopted an early offer medical malpractice reform proposal,
there continues to be a need for more flexible tort reform policies rather
than a rigid cap on noneconomic damages.
The empirical evidence with respect to the impacts of medical
malpractice reforms on physician behavior, patient treatments, and health
outcomes is less well-established empirically than insurance market
impacts of reforms such as noneconomic damages caps. Many of the
studies to date have focused on specific medical specialties, such as
obstetrics. Additional research may provide insight into the
generalizability, magnitude, and welfare consequences of the reform
effects. However, based on existing evidence, the main consequences of
the reforms have been to reduce the costs incurred by defendants and the
funds received by claimants. The ramifications for the health care system
are much less pronounced.

